Römerbrief. Z kolei drugim jest Douglas J. Moo, przedstawiciel typowego dla współ-czesnej egzegezy stylu komentowania Listu do Rzymian, bazującego na metodzie historyczno-krytycznej.
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Słowa klucze: Tomasz z Akwinu; Karl Barth; Douglas J. Moo; Rz 7, [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] egzegeza. T he Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectura (hereafter ad Rom) of Thomas Aquinas is one of the most famous biblical commentaries written in the Middle Ages. This text is part of a larger collection of readings and commentaries on all of the letters of the Apostle to the Nations (the so-called Corpus Paulinum). According to J.-P. Torrell, Aquinas probably wrote this book at the conclusion of his scientific work in Naples, between 1272-73.
1 Thomas Prügl, however, suggests that the commentaries on Paul's epistles were the primary subject of the lectures of the new magister in sacra pagina in 1256. 2 The commentary, along with a reading on the Gospel of St. John (Lectura super Ioannem) , is an example of a perfect synthesis of philosophy, theology, and biblical exegesis. Thomas Aquinas's remarks are still valid and may constitute a valuable contribution to contemporary research on the Bible. The present stalemate of diachronically historical-critical methods once again creates an opportunity for alternative methods of interpreting the Scriptures. Biblical Thomism may bring revealing insights to this hermeneutic process. 3 In this paper, I would like to focus on the pericope Rom 7:14-25, especially on the problem of understanding the rhetorical 'I' in Aquinas's Ad Rom, as 1 For more on this topic, see J.-P. Torrell Thomas, . 3 The most famous representative of Biblical Thomism is undoubtedly Matthew Levering; among his works, the following are particularly worthy of attention: M. Levering exegetical explanation of the pronoun 'I' in Ad Rom. The second part includes the opinions of contemporary biblical scholars on the rhetorical 'I' of the pericope. The first scholar is Karl Barth whose well-known monograph Römerbrief is an example of the philosophical (or anti-philosophical) and theological approaches to St. Paul's epistle. The second scholar is Douglas J. Moo, who represents classical historical-critical exegesis of Romans.
The rhetorical 'I' in Aquinas's reflections on Rom 7:14-25
Aquinas presents two possible ways to read the 'I' in verse 7:14 of the Epistle to the Romans ("This passage can be interpreted in two ways: in one way so that the Apostle is speaking in the person of a man existing in sin; but later […] he explained it as though the Apostle is speaking in his own person, i.e., of a man in the state of grace" 5 ). He sees an exegetical problem with the pronoun 'I' , one which had already appeared in ancient patristic exegesis. In Origen and most of the Greek Fathers, 'I' is understood to be a person existing in sin, whereas in Augustine and other Latin Fathers it is understood to be a person in the state of grace. 6 In addition, Thomas specifically refers this personal pronoun to the person of St. Paul ("But later in a book against Julian he explained it as though the Apostle is speaking in his own person" Aquinas starts by explaining the meaning of the personal pronoun ego in verse 14. In his opinion, in this fragment we find the rhetorical figure of the synecdoche. 9 The pronoun 'I' (ego) primarily means reason, as it is considered the most important part of a human being ("for man's reason, which is the chief thing in man" 10 ). Thus, Thomas states that man can be described using the term the reasoning mind ("hence each man seems to be his own reason or intellect" 11 ). After a comment on the passage ego autem carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato, in which Aquinas explains the meaning of the term bodily reason, he goes on to discuss verse 15: quod enim operor non intellego (Ad Rom 7:15, no. 563).
In the first case we have a man who consciously commits sins. He knows that sin is forbidden but he sins anyway ("who understands in general that sin should not be committed" 12 ). This is a result of his lifestyle. Aquinas uses here the Latin term victus. This sinful way of life can have three causes: influence of the devil (suggestione Daemonis), passions (passione), or acquired bad tendencies (inclinatione perversi habitus). Thomas emphasises that these deeds are contrary to conscience (conscientia). 13 The following description of conscience appears in The Summa Theologiae:
Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into 'cum alio scientia' , i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act (ST I Q. 79, Art. 13). Thus, Aquinas shows the tension between the cognitive order and the order of action. On the one hand, we have a cognitive verb, intelligo. On the other hand, we have derivates of the verb opero, e.g. in the syntagmas non esse operandum peccatum and non esse operandum. We also find the verb facio in the phrase contra conscientiam faciens. Both of these words are related to the sphere of sin and prohibited acts (peccatum and non esse operandum). In other words, the will expressed by deeds is subject to the reality of carnality (see a commentary on the phrase ego autem carnalis sum venundatus sub peccato). It seems that Thomas recognises a certain autonomy and freedom of corporeality in reference to the human reason. Earlier, Aquinas stated that reason might succumb to the flesh (Ad Rom 7:14, no. 560: "But man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal […] in one way from the fact that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to things to which the flesh urges it […] another way reason is said to be carnal, because it is under attack from the flesh" 15 ), but here he emphasises that reason includes the general knowledge that one should avoid sin ("who understands in general that sin should not be committed" 16 ). Do we perceive a contradiction here? This general reluctance to commit sin is most likely to refer to the first moral principle of natural law recognised by practical reason: bonum est faciedendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. 17 Thus man does not want to commit evil deeds, but at the same time his mind may succumb to the flesh. In spite of everything, reason is characterised by a certain degree of autonomy and freedom, for example, in the case of knowing the basic norms of natural law. But at the same time we see the significant impact on human behaviour of what Aquinas described as a perverted way of life/lifestyle (victus). The relationship between ways of life, human activity, and the moral philosophy and mind of Thomas Aquinas in the light of Wittgenstein's philosophy is shown in the splendid monograph written by R. Pouivet. 18 This part of the reflection ends with a quote from Luke 12:47: servus sciens voluntatem domini sui et non faciens, digne plagis vapulabit multis. We should remember that quotations from various books of the Bible in the works of Aquinas function not as ornaments but as demonstrations of a broader canonical perspective, in which a fragment of the pericope being commented on is included. This kind of canonical approach is still based on a historical/literal sense In the other interpretation of Rom 7:15, Aquinas speaks about a man in the state of grace ("In another way it can be understood of one in the state of grace" 21 ). Here, Aquinas, using the verb opero, insists that the redeemed man is basically evil (operatur malum). However, elsewhere in his work he clarifies that he has in mind the reality of desire (concupiscentia), 22 which remains in the baptised/redeemed man as a trace of original sin ("but only by desiring through a passion in the sensitive appetite" 23 ). The desire (concupiscentia) to act arising in the sensitive appetite exists prior to the reason or intellect ("and that desire escapes the reason or intellect, because it exists before the intellect's judgment. When the judgment is made, the desire is impeded" 24 ). Thus, on the one hand, we have a desire to act according to the body/flesh. Importantly, the concupiscentia is evil, but not in deed or in the consent of the mind ("He does evil not by performing the deed or consenting with the mind" 25 ). On the other hand, we have our reason and free will under grace primarily associated with the soul. Thus, if we act in the power of the Holy Spirit, we can resist the desire.
The second interpretation is based on Thomas's anthropological principles, in which the rational dimension of the human being (our soul) dominates over the sensitive appetite (body/flesh forget that this anthropological dualism is based on the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of hylomorphism. In other words, man is a being composed of two elements: the soul (form) and the body (matter). The soul is not a human being but a substantial form. Thus, when we read about the struggle between the mind/soul and the concupiscentia linked to the body/flesh, we should remember that this occurs in one subject, one human being. This is a relatively positive and optimistic vision. However, we should also remember that prior to the resurrection, as long as we live in the fully-unredeemed world, even when living under grace, the concupiscentia still acts through our body/flesh. 26 Aquinas refers to a person subject to sin and person in the state of grace in the singular, as for him this person is the Apostle Paul. However, the context might suggest that he was also thinking about every man. These two readings are not mutually exclusive. Paul represents the existential situation of every man. We can say that in Rom 7:14-25 the 'I' means the redeemed/unredeemed man in the singular reading, i.e. especially Paul, or redeemed/unredeemed men, in plural form, i.e. every believer or every sinner. Aquinas's interpretation of 'I' as a person under grace has great and truly deep existential potential and treats the common experience of every believer. When a reader becomes acquainted with Aquinas's commentary on Paul's letters for the first time, his scholastic language may seem dry and lifeless. But when we get involved in this scholastic language and understand the passion, spirituality, and the wisdom purpose of his theological activity, 27 we can find deep insight into our existential situation, tension between our life in the state of grace -through sacraments and moral activity -and our life in the state of sin, because we still commit venial and sometimes mortal sins, as we still feel lust and desire in our existence according to the body/flesh. Aquinas, seeing this dialectical dimension of our life, discovers in Paul's thought a source which enables him to describe this ambiguity. In fact, Aquinas's interpretation seems truly existential and equivalent to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, but we can see that this is only true when we participate in scholastic language games and scholastic metaphysical dialect.
Rom 7:14-25 and contemporary exegesis
In this section two examples of contemporary commentaries on Rom 7:14-25 will be discussed. One, which is philosophical -though it might even be described as anti-philosophical -is Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans (second edition, published 1922). 28 The other is the historical-critical commentary on the Epistle to the Romans by Douglas J. Moo We see that Barth's commentary on Rom 7:14-25 is original, greatly marked by his anthropological and theological principia. Barth, like Aquinas, wants to be faithful to the Apostle Paul. However, in many places in Romans he reads this text against Paul's intentions. Another example is the pericope 1:18-32, in which Barth turns Paul's natural theology into a protest against anti-natural theology. For Barth, Paul's thought is only the starting point for his own reading. As in Aquinas's commentary, Barth uses the tools of philosophy, or of a kind of anti-philosophy, but the proportions and role of philosophy are radically different. For Aquinas, divine revelation, philosophy, divine truth, and the truth of reason are mutually complementary. Of course, divine truth is greater than reason, since through divine revelation we can discover truths such as the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and so on. For Barth we can come to know God only through revelation and faith. Philosophy shows only the limitations of human cognition.
The second example is The Epistle to the Romans, a commentary on Romans by Douglas J. Moo. Moo's work is a contemporary historical-critical commentary on the biblical book. In accordance with the historical-critical method, Moo's commentary focuses especially on the literal sense of Scripture. Thus, Moo analyses Rom 7:14-25, especially in the context of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans and other works. Moo interprets the rhetorical 'I' as referring to a person in the state of sin (he uses the term unregenerate) or grace (he uses the term regenerate). Moo compares arguments for the first and second interpretations. 32 The arguments for the unregenerate person are as follows: the pronoun 'I' (Greek ego) is connected with 'the flesh' (Greek sarx) in 14:18-25; is in sin (v. 14b) and a prisoner of the law of sin (v. 23); The 'I' struggles with obedience to the Mosaic law. On the other hand, believers are released from the law and from the power of sin (vv. 6,2.6.11.14.18-22; 7,4-6) . 33 The arguments for the regenerate person are as follows: the ego in vv. 14-25 seeks to obey the law of God, but the unregenerate do not; the mind in vv. 14-25 is not opposed to God and observes the law of God; the concept of the 'inner man' refers to the Christian; Paul in vv. 14-25 uses present, in vv. 7-13 past tenses, thus underlining the shift from the experience of the unregenerate to that of the regenerate person. 34 As we see, this commentary is limited to a literal interpretation, without the philosophical and systematic-theological inspiration we find in Barth's and Aquinas's texts. Moo takes into consideration the literary and theological context of the Epistle to the Romans and other writings of St. Paul. Finally, this researcher recognises that in Rom 7:14-25 we have the unregenerate man:
Our conclusion, already indicated in the exegesis of 7:7-12, is that vv. 14-25 describe the situation of an unregenerate person. Specifically, I think that Paul is looking back, from his Christian understanding, to the situation of himself, and other Jews like him, living under the law of Moses. Of course, Paul is not giving us a full picture of that situation; he is concentrating on the negatives because this is what he must do to prove how useless the law was in terms of delivering Jews from their bondage to sin. We might say, then, that Rom 7:14-25 describes from a personal viewpoint the stage in salvation history that Paul delineates objectively in Gal 3: 19-4:3. 35 
Conlusion
This short review of Aquinas's commentary on Rom 7:14-25 and contemporary approaches to this text, focusing especially on the rhetorical 'I' , shows that Paul's thought is still fascinating and has not been sufficiently examined. Different approaches, using many kinds of philosophical tools (for example scholastic, analytic, or existentially philosophical) as well as historical-critical and theological methods reveal the limitations of a single approach and afford a new look at the multiple senses of the Scripture, transcending the exclusively literal sense shown by the New Rhetoric and contemporary philosophy of language. This creates the possibility of multifaceted analysis of Scripture involving philosophers, theologians, and representatives of other disciplines, for example the social sciences. Thus we might say that Aquinas has contributed to renewal not only in biblical theology but also in biblical philosophy. This new approach to the relationship between Scripture, theology, and philosophy should abandon the mediaeval concept of philosophy as existing in the service of theology. Renewal of biblical philosophy should involve co-operation on the same level and afford deeper insight into the sense of Scripture.
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35 Ibidem, Good examples of contemporary biblical philosophy include: J. Taubes, Teologia polityczna świętego Pawła; G. Agamben, Czas, który zostaje.; A. Badiou, Święty Paweł. 
